Morphing engines classification by code histogram by Babak Bashari Rad, et al.
 Symposium on Information & Computer Sciences (ICS 2011) 
9 
 
Morphing Engines Classification by Code Histogram 
 
Babak Bashari Rad1, Maslin Masrom2, 3Suhaimi Ibrahim, 4Zalina Mohd Daud 
1Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology, 2,4 Razak School of Engineering and Advanced 
Technology, 3Advanced Informatics School 
University Technology of Malaysia 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
1babak.basharirad@hotmail.com, 2maslin@ic.utm.my, 3suhaimiibrahim@utm.my, 4zalina@ic.utm.my 
 
 
Abstract— Morphing engines or mutation engines are 
exploited by metamorphic virus to change the code 
appearance in every new generation. The purpose of 
these engines is to escape from the signature-based 
scanner, which employs a unique string signature to 
detect the virus. Although the obfuscation techniques 
try to convert the binary sequence of the code, in some 
techniques, the statistical feature of the code binaries 
will be still remain unchanged, relatively. Accordingly, 
this feature can be utilized to classify the engine and 
detect the morphed virus code. In this article, we are 
going to introduce a new idea to classify the 
obfuscation engines based on their code statistical 
feature using the histogram comparison.  
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Morphing Engines, Obfuscation Engines, Mutation 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of code obfuscation techniques is to 
make program codes more complicated to be 
comprehensible by a static analysis [1-2]. To achieve 
this purpose, the obfuscation engine transforms the 
program code to another dissimilar edition, but keeps 
the behavior of the different versions equivalent [3]. 
This skill can be used to protect the software from 
tampering or being visible for hackers, however it is 
widely being utilized by virus writers to make their virus 
armored against the antivirus experts [4]. Metamorphic 
viruses try to convert their code into new versions with 
dissimilar byte sequences, by means of obfuscation 
techniques. Therefore, traditional string signature-
based scanners are not efficiently able to detect and 
classify the new instances. 
In this study, we aim to propose a relatively novel 
idea to deal with metamorphic engine, which 
emphasizes on a statistical feature of the code, the 
histogram of the code bytes. Here, we are going to 
show that this new approach is applicable for 
classification of the obfuscation engines. This solution 
can be developed and improved in the future to be 
more reliable and effectual and be used in the antivirus 
scanners. 
In next section, we review the recent attempts on 
this problem and most related methodologies and 
experiments. Then we present our proposed solution 
and explain its novelty. In the next part, we illustrate the 
methodology and implementation process, and in the 
final section, we give the summary and some 
recommendations for the future developments. 
 
II. PREVIOUS RELATED WORKS 
Several studies and experiments have been 
conducted on the metamorphic virus and obfuscation 
engines detection and classification problems. Wong 
and Stamp in [5] utilized the Hidden Markov Model for 
detection of metamorphic engines. They extracted 
assembly opcode sequence from manually 
disassembled assembly source files of a virus family 
collection and trained a HMM to present the virus 
family characteristics. Later, they used the trained 
model to classify the metamorphic virus. The drawback 
with their approach was the disassembling preprocess. 
It was a time-consuming, incompetent and impossible, 
especially when it deals with considerable quantity of 
virus files. Furthermore, they implement experiments to 
compare the similarity between some pairs of morphed 
variants of the obfuscation engines by employing the 
method developed by Mishra in [6]. His method 
compares two opcode sequences by considering all 
subsequences of three consecutive opcodes from each 
sequence.  
Govindaraj in [7] also used Hidden Markov Model 
for the metamorphic virus detection problem, but he 
focused on a practical solution to deal with executable 
files directly. His method extracts the code section of 
the infected portable executable containing the virus 
code. Then it detects the 14 MFO (Most Frequently 
Occurred) instruction opcodes and builds a opcode 
sequence to train the HMM. He eliminated the manual 
preprocess disassembly phase completely.  
Karnik et al. in [8] used the cosine similarity function 
to compare two suspicious infected files upon the static 
analysis of the portable executable files. They proved 
that for some given metamorphic variants of a virus, it 
is possible to classify them using the cosine similarity 
function.  
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Lin and Stamp in [9] show that it is possible to make 
the metamorphic viruses not detectable via Hidden 
Markov Model detectors, by morphing viruses such a 
way that they looks similar to benign programs. They 
showed that the HMM-based classifiers could not 
success when they inserted some sub-procedures 
copied from normal files, but inserting the copy of small 
code pieces had not produced the same result. 
Rad et al. in [10] used the histogram of the machine 
instruction opcodes as a feature to present a virus 
variant. They utilized the Euclidean histogram distance 
metric to compare a pair of portable executable files.  
They showed that for some particular obfuscation 
techniques, their simple introduced approach could 
detect morphed variants of a file. In [11], Rad et al. 
used another histogram metric, Manhattan metric, and 
compare the result obtained by two Minkowski-form 
distances with r = 1 and r = 2. In both two latter ones, 
Rad et al. applied a preprocess phase to manually 
disassemble each portable executable file, break it 
down into its building function blocks and extract the 
instruction opcodes and convert them to a histogram as 
a feature of the file. 
III. OBFUSCATION ENGINES 
A. Morphing Techniques 
Metamorphic viruses can obfuscate their body by 
several techniques. The most applicable techniques 
are [3, 10, 12-13]:  
1) Register or variable exchange - using different 
registers or variables in code instructions for each new 
produced instance,  
 
2) instruction substitution - replacing instructions with 
their possible equivalents instructions or code blocks or 
subroutines,  
 
3) Code transposition - code and subroutines reordering 
or changing the flow control by conditional or unconditional 
jumps,  
 
4) Instruction permutation - reordering instructions that 
are independent, 
 
5) Garbage code insertion – inserting NOP instruction 
and other instruction that has no effects on the operation of 
the code among the original program instructions.  
 
B. Metamorphic Virus Creation Kits 
Virus creation kits, which are widely employed 
recent years, are serious matters of the antivirus 
vendors. These kits make the generation process very 
simple, such that no professional programming or 
computer knowledge is required to produce new 
viruses. Many virus construction tools are accessible 
and can be downloaded from internet [14]. Some of 
them employ stealth and anti-antivirus techniques to 
make the task of virus scanner harder. In addition, 
some kits are equipped with obfuscation engines to 
produce metamorphic virus variants.  
One of the most famous and powerful tools is 
NGVCK(Next Generation Virus Creation Kit), which is 
introduced in 2001 [12]. It has an advanced mutation 
engine and can automatically produce high quality 
morphed variants of the virus. Wong and Stamp in [5] 
calculated the similarity between each pair of virus 
variants created by four virus creation tools, NGVCK, 
VCL32, MPCGEN, and G2,  downloaded from the 
VxHeaven website [14]. Their findings demonstrate that 
the efficiency of these kits differs very much. Among 
the mentioned tested tools, the best generator kit, 
NGVCK, is capable to generate virus variants that 
contain only a small amount of similarity, the other tools 
creates variants that are very similar, more than 60 
percent, on average. Randomly chosen benign 
programs have about 35 percent likeness, which show 
that, except the NGVCK, the other virus creation kits 
cannot efficiently mutate the code [5]. Therefore, based 
on their experiments, NGVCK obviously perform better 
than the other kits in terms of producing dissimilar virus 
variants, means that the virus variants generated by 
NGVCK are significantly dissimilar from their other 
family members, while the virus variants created by the 
other tools are more similar. 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed solution is a development of the 
methodology presented by Rad et al. in [10]. It is based 
on the concept of using the statistical feature of the 
virus variants, but in new solution, we suggest some 
improvements and novel ideas:  
A. Eliminate the Disassembly Process 
The first development of the presented approach by 
Rad et al. in [10] is to remove the manual disassembly 
phase. We suggest implementing the algorithm directly 
on the binary executable files. With this idea, it would 
be more practical to be employed by antivirus software.  
In addition, manual preprocess section include of 
binary code disassembling, breaking down and feature 
extraction is very time-consuming. In new proposed 
method, it will be contain of feature extraction part, 
meaning that the algorithm extract the bytes of the 
virus and produce a histogram of the code, which is the 
representative of the virus. 
B. Histogram as the Feature for a Virus Family  
After feature extraction process for each member of 
a metamorphic family, we can make an average of the 
created histograms and produce a more general 
histogram as the representative of the virus family. It 
can be later used to classify whether a new virus 
belongs to a family or not. To achieve this purpose, we 
have to specify an appropriate threshold value that is 
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able to classify a new virus and decide that it matches 
with which known virus family. 
C. Code and Data Analysis 
In [10], the authors experimented the algorithm on 
the code section of the virus file and the histograms are 
created only from the instructions opcodes. In this 
paper, we propose to make the histogram from the 
both instructions code and data bytes, including the 
instructions opcodes and operands. We believe that 
because all family member of a metamorphic engine 
use a same constant algorithm to generate the 
variants, an average of their histograms can represent 
the family statistical characteristics in terms of 
employing similar instructions. However, this can work 
properly if the representative histogram of a family 
constructed from enough number of the family 
members, otherwise it cannot be sufficiently trustable 
to classify the members correctly. 
 
V. METHODOLOGY 
A. Feature Extraction 
Each metamorphic virus engine has a histogram as 
the representative of the family. It includes of the 
average statistical characteristic of the engine. To find 
such a histogram as the feature, we can extract the 
code statistics and present it as a histogram for each 
member of the family. Then we produce an average 
histogram to show the statistical characteristic of the 
engine. Fig. 1 demonstrates this process, briefly. 
B. Classification 
For each virus family, a threshold value must be 
selected such that be able to classify the family 
members correctly. It means that it must make the false 
negatives and false positives as less as possible. 
Distance between the histogram of the input file and 
representative histogram of the engine can be 
calculated via several distance metrics. The Minkowski-
form distance measurement, with r = 2, or Euclidean 
distance is one of the most common metrics to 
measure the dissimilarity of two histograms [15]. 
 
dX,Y2 = − 

	

 
 
 Choosing the proper threshold value is the crucial 
issue in this classification problem. Fig. 2 shows the 
classification procedure.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Feature extraction process. 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we present a simple novel idea for 
classifying the metamorphic engines based on their 
code statistical property. This statistical feature is 
presented by a histogram of the code bytes for each 
obfuscation engine or virus family, distinctly. We 
believe for a large scale of data set include of virus 
family members, the representative histogram can 
reveal the statistical feature of the family. Then, 
histogram distance metrics can be used to compare 
the histogram of a suspected file with the histogram of 
a virus family to find whether it is a member of that 
family or not. 
In this paper, we have not examined the proposed 
solution, so the efficiency of the improvements is not 
evaluated and compared to previous method. We plan 
to implement the proposed improvements and evaluate 
the efficiency of new ideas in the future researches. 
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The most advantage of this method is the low 
complexity of implementation. This is very simple 
approach to classify the morphing engines. 
For the future works, this simple method can be 
developed for other statistical properties or it may be 
limited and filtered for some special byte values that 
are more specific for a particular virus family. In 
addition, the histogram comparison can be weighted to 
emphasize on certain family properties. 
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Figure 2.  Feature classification process. 
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